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UNEQUAL JUSTICE
FOR THE POOR:
THEORY, RESEARCH,
AND COMMENTARY
MITCHELL S. G. KLEIN*
WALTER J. BURKARD**
During the 1960's and early 1970's, concern for providing equal jus-
tice for the poor in the United States reached its peak. The result was an
increase in governmental funding of legal assistance programs and consid-
erable research into the treatment of the poor under our legal system.
Sparked by the "War on Poverty" and encouraged by the Warren Court's
decisions promoting the right to counsel and other constitutional safe-
guards for the criminally accused, attention was focused on assessing and
remedying the inequalities of justice for the indigent.' The recent ebbing
of interest in poverty law and the raging battles over the elimination of
such remedial programs as the federally funded Legal Services Corpora-
tion2 suggest the need for further examination of the relationship between
money and justice in America. The purpose of this Article is to explore
the current character and severity of unequal justice for the poor in the
United States.
UNEQUAL JUSTICE-PERCEPTION AND REALITY
Traditionally, commentators have proclaimed that poor people re-
ceive inferior treatment from the law. Anatole France made this well-
known satirical assertion: "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids all
men to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread-the
*B.A., 1974; M.A., 1975, State University of New York at Buffalo; Ph.D., Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1979.
** B.A., 1981; M.A., 1982, State University of New York at Buffalo.
See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 269 (1976); Garfinkel, Foreword to J. HANDLER, E.
HOLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS xiii (1978); R.
HERMANN, E. SINGLE & J. BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 1-2 (1977).
1 See Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor, 26 VILL. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (1981).
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rich and the poor." s The perceived failure to administer justice equally is
reflected in American political folklore as well. Finlay Peter Dunne's Mr.
Dooley remarked that "a poor man has a chanst in coort. . . .He has th'
same chanst there that he has outside. He has a splendid poor man's
chanst. 14 Political leaders, too, have pointed to the problem of unequal
treatment under the law. Robert F. Kennedy once observed that "the
poor man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as a friend. For him the
law is always taking something away."5 Similarly, academicians have ob-
served disparities in the nature of the law and its operation. Professor
Lawrence Freidman has stated that "on the whole, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that justice is not as blind and classless as it pretends; it squints in
one direction."'
Despite this unanimity of pointed commentary, the connection be-
tween poverty and injustice in the United States cannot be said to be
automatic. It would simply be inaccurate to assert that affluent people are
invariable winners in our legal system and poor people are always losers.
Surely, a legal system can be readily conceived which treats the poor far
more inequitably. Addressing the question of discrimination by the judi-
ciary, Herbert Jacob has warned: "[i]t is easy to jump to conclusions
based on superficial observations; the reality is quite complicated. '7 For
example, there is evidence demonstrating that the police response time in
the United States is the same for the poor as for the rich,8 and that the
sentencing disparities between the rich and the poor for the same crime
are insubstantial.9 Indeed, a recent study of criminal justice in New York
City concluded that once certain differential factors were taken into ac-
count, a defendant represented by the Legal Aid Society was, if anything,
slightly less likely to be convicted, and if convicted, slightly less likely to
receive a prison term than those who had private attorneys.1 0 Then too,
during the last 50 years, the judiciary itself has engaged in remedial judi-
cial activism beneficial to poor people.. Clearly, there are subtleties in
A. FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE ch. 7 (1894), quoted in H. SCHMANDrT, COURTS IN THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM 86 (1968).
4 F.P. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 173 (E.J. Bander comp. 1963).
P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: 1965 6 n.13 (1965) (quoting Address by Robert F. Kennedy
on Law Day, at the University of Chicago Law School) (May 1, 1964)).
L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM 182 (1975).
H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 7 (3d ed. 1978).
Mladenka & Hill, The Distribution of Urban Police Services (1975) (unpublished paper
for Midwest Political Science Association).
9 See Hagan, Extra-legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Socio-
logical Viewpoint, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 357, 375-78 (1974).
1o R. HERMANN, E. SINGLE & J. BOSTON, supra note 1, at 104-05. The authors concluded that
"[a]ll else being equal, defendants represented by Legal Aid would fare as well as if not
better than those who had private attorneys." Id. at 105.
" See G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 196-97 (rev. ed. 1974).
UNEQUAL JUSTICE
the interrelationship of indigency and inequality of justice. Yet, examina-
tion of certain factors in our system still leads to the conclusion that "we
have a concept of equality that is inversely linked to the prime rate."1
The following discussion analyzes the impact of these factors on the
treatment of the poor under our legal system.
LEGAL PARTICIPANTS
Lawyers
The availability of diligent legal assistance is, of course, essential to
the goal of equal justice for the poor.1 8 Although certain political rights
are constitutionally guaranteed in the United States, the enforcement of
those rights is often undermined by lack of access to adequate legal repre-
sentation.1" Our country has sought to rectify the situation substantially,
though belatedly, by providing free legal assistance. 15 Many private
organizations such as legal aid societies and general charitable organiza-
tions now make legal assistance available to the indigent. Additionally,
since the mid-1960's, the federal government itself has assumed a major
role in bringing legal services to poor people. In 1965, the Johnson admin-
istration instituted a legal services program under the aegis of the now
dismantled Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The OEO program
was followed in 1974 by the establishment of a permanent national legal
services program, the Legal Services Corporation."
Despite these efforts, however, many of the poor must forego justice
due to the unavailability of lawyers. In 1976, Thomas Ehrlich, the first
President of the Legal Services Corporation, estimated that 40% of
America's poor people lack access to legal assistance.1 7 Recently, it was
estimated that the current Legal Services programs handle only about
one-eighth of the legal needs of eligible persons.1 ' Speaking in favor of
"' Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REv. 651, 655
(1981).
13 A survey of the history of the provision of legal assistance to the poor in the United
States can be found in Handler, United States of America in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID
318-40 (F. Zemans ed. 1979).
" "Accessibility to the courts on equal terms is essential to equality before the law. If we
cannot provide this foundational protection through the courts, most of the rest of our
promises of liberty and justice for all remains a mockery for the poor and the oppressed."
Weinstein, supra note 12, at 655.
'6 See, e.g., The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 42 U.S.C. §
2996 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
6 See Cramton, supra note 2, at 524-25.
17 Hearings on the Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill Before the Subcomm. of the
House Appropriations Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1976) (statement of Thomas
Ehrlich).
1' Cramton, supra note 2, at 530.
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federal funding of legal assistance, Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the
federal district court for the Eastern District of New York recently re-
marked: "[elqual access to the judicial process is the sine qua non of a
just society. While we have made enormous strides towards that goal, it is
still a glaring truth that equality of access is in the real world little more
than a figment of jurisprudential imagination.' 9
In addition to the limited availability of lawyers for the poor, difficul-
ties and injustices are also encountered in qualifying for the assistance
available. To receive legal services, the applicant must often prove his
indigency. In criminal cases, judges frequently use the "operational" test
of whether a defendant can meet bail to determine eligibility. Thus, a
criminal defendant qualifies by failing to meet bail and remaining in jail
until his case is heard.2 0 One study suggests that judges are now willing to
tolerate the almost automatic appointment of a Legal Aid Society lawyer
in criminal cases because eligibility guidelines are formulated on unrealis-
tic standards of poverty and not on the actual cost of engaging a compe-
tent attorney in an urban area.2 Many defendants would otherwise be
ineligible for assistance, and yet still be unable to pay for a criminal de-
fense. In civil cases, the defendant also must meet eligibility requirements
and have the type of case that a legal assistance program is willing to
accept. In order to qualify under current Legal Service Corporation eligi-
bility standards, a single person can earn no more than $5,388 and a liti-
gant with a family of four can earn no more than $10,563.22 Additionally,
because of its limited resources and overworked staff, an office may often
refuse certain cases.
Because of the unavailability of legal aid or a defendant's ineligibility
for funded programs, the poor are often forced to engage "low-budget"
lawyers who are willing to take their cases.2 To a large degree, this in-
creases the likelihood that they will be represented by low-status lawyers
on the fringe of the profession.2 4 The result, it is submitted, is that the
legal assistance a poor person will receive is generally inferior to the assis-
tance available to the affluent.
Several factors play a role in preventing the poor from obtaining
19 Weinstein, supra note 12, at 655.
20 H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 68-69.
21 R. HERMANN, E. SINGLE & J. BOSTON, supra note 1, at 79-80. The authors have observed
that, in 1976, for example, the Legal Aid guidelines provided that a client would be ineligi-
ble for legal assistance if he earned more than $85 a week (plus $10 for each dependent). Id.
at 80.
" 45 C.F.R. § 1611 app. A (1981).
23 R. HERMANN, E. SINGLE & J. BOSTON, supra note 1, at 80.
24 See generally Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice
and the Law, in BEFORE THE LAW 193, 199-200 (J. Bonsignore, E. Katsh, P. d'Errico, R.
Pipkin, S. Arons & J. Rifkin 2d ed. 1974).
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superior legal representation. First, poor people often simply lack the eco-
nomic resources which would bring them into contact with a good attor-
ney. Family income and property ownership are considered strong
predictors of contact with attorneys.25 The poor rarely have ongoing con-
tact with lawyers because the legal profession emphasizes property mat-
ters, often to the virtual exclusion of the kinds of problems experienced
by the poor.2 6 Second, the poor generally are undesirable clients. A
lawyer's status is determined not only by his income, but also by the so-
cial characteristics of his clientele and the nature of his clients' legal
problems.2 7 Additionally, few poor people know where or how to obtain
qualified legal help.28 Lawyers rarely list areas of specialization. Notwith-
standing the removal of formal prohibitions against advertising, many
qualified attorneys remain reluctant to advertise. Thus, a poor person sel-
dom knows if a particular lawyer is capable of handling his case, or
whether the fees he is being charged are competitive or fair.
The disparity in the quality of legal services available to the poor
stems also from the stratification which exists in the legal profession it-
self. Lawyers, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, "naturally constitute a
body."2 Yet, lawyers in contemporary America are no longer members of
a homogenous fraternity. As sociologist Jack Ladinsky has noted, during
"the past sixty years, a highly stratified bar has evolved in urban
America."30 The bar, it has been suggested, is stratified into four catego-
ries consisting of solo practitioners, small-firm lawyers, middle-sized firm
lawyers and large-firm lawyers."1 Because of socialization and organiza-
tional recruitment processes, lawyers who practice in small firms or as
solo practitioners are generally graduates of state or proprietary schools,
from working-class or small-merchant families, exposed to lower level
courts and agencies and appear to have lower-class clientele. At the other
extreme, large-firm lawyers are generally graduates of prestigious, highly
competitive law schools, from high status backgrounds, have relatively
high incomes, have higher status clients and work with higher level courts
and agencies. This suggests that the corporate clients of big firms receive
the benefits of the disproportionate pooling of highly qualified, socially
well-situated, well-trained lawyers in large firms."'
,6 See Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contracts, 34 AM. Soc. REV. 309,
312-13 (1969).
" Id. at 317.
,7 See H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 74-75.
" Id. at 64.
29 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 78 (1900).
Ladinsky, supra note 24, at 93.
J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 18 (1966).
31 Ladinsky, supra note 24, at 197-98. Ladinsky has concluded that "[olne result [of the
stratification of the bar] has been a high development of corporation protection, often at the
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It is further submitted that the economics of serving low-income cli-
ents often results in less ethical conduct by lawyers. In his 1966 study of
New York City attorneys, sociologist Jerome Carlin found a strong rela-
tionship between a lawyer's status in the bar and his adherence to ethical
norms. The lower the status of a lawyer's clientele, the more precarious
and financially insecure his practice. Given that the solo practitioner's cli-
ents are generally "one time" affairs, he is highly susceptible to the temp-
tation of exploiting "expendable" clients. Notably, Carlin observed:
The majority of lawyers in large firms are high conformers. As firm size
decreases, the proportion of high conformers decreases from 57 per cent of
large-firm lawyers to 20 per cent of individual practitioners. Correspond-
ingly, as size of the firm increases, the proportion of violators decreases,
from 30 per cent of individual practitioners to only 5 per cent of large-firm
lawyers.33
Given existing economic pressures on poor people's lawyers, it appears
likely that lower-status clients may be victimized more often by their
lawyers."
In short, poor people in the United States are less likely to obtain
effective and highly ethical legal assistance. Justice cannot be entirely
equal when big business and wealthy individuals are able to purchase the
best trained, most highly skilled attorneys. The wider availability of legal
services, reflected in the creation of the Legal Services Corporation and
the increase in public defender programs, has narrowed the gap between
the rich and poor to a slight extent. 85 Yet, as described above, these pro-
grams have only alleviated a small percentage of the need. Even these
expense of individual citizens." Id. at 201.
33 J. CARLIN, supra note 31, at 55.
31 Jerome Carlin has advocated remedial "measures such as government subsidy, prepaid
insurance plans and group legal practice" to "increase and stabilize the demand for legal
services, thereby enhancing the economic security of marginal practitioners." J. CARLIN,
supra note 31, at 181. Carlin's proposals have the dual benefit of broadening the availability
of legal services, while at the same time increasing the financial security of lawyers practic-
ing at the lower levels of the bar, thus "strengthening their capacity to conform to ethical
norms." Id. at 180.
*" See generally J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, supra note 1, at 46-47.
The Supreme Court decisions expanding the provision of lawyers for indigents in the crimi-
nal justice system spurred the development of both government-funded legal assistance pro-
grams and public defender offices. In 1961, defender programs existed in only three percent
of the counties of the country and served only one-quarter of the population. By 1973, 650
defender programs were providing services in 28% of all United States counties, reaching
two-thirds of the population. Id. at 39. The creation of the Legal Services Corporation pro-
vided an "institutional framework ... favorable to a proactive, social-reform-oriented pro-
gram with lawyers who are expressly allowed to seek social change on behalf of the poor." B.
GARTH, NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMs FOR THE PooR: A CoMPARATrvE STUDY OF RECENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN LEG l AID AND IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 46-47 (1980).
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programs are currently endangered by possible budget cutbacks.
Judges
Judges in the United States do not, of course, represent a random
cross-section of the American population. Few Americans expect judges
to be representative in background characteristics. After all, as John R.
Schmidhauser has noted, the Supreme Court "has always been veiled...
in an aura of inaccessibility." 6 Hence, notwithstanding the Horatio Alger
dream, "it is hardly likely that many young men of humble origin have
lost sleep contemplating their prospects for attaining a seat on the Su-
preme Court of the United States. 3 7 This does not mean that individuals
from an impoverished background have never served on the Supreme
Court. For example, Arthur Goldberg's father was a pushcart peddler and
William 0. Douglas' widowed mother washed clothes to support her fam-
ily. It has been documented that most of the justices froin humble origins
were appointed by presidents who actively sought support from lower-
economic-status voters-Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren and Frank-
lin Roosevelt. Sheldon Goldman and Thomas Jahnige found that 28% of
justices appointed by Democratic presidents were from humble origins,
compared to 9% of justices appointed by Republicans."
The presence of a few exceptions, however, does not mask the fact
that nearly all justices have had upper-status backgrounds. As
Schmidhauser has demonstrated: "[tjhroughout American history there
has been an overwhelming tendency for presidents to choose nominees for
the Supreme Court from among the socially advantaged families.""0
Henry J. Abraham has developed a composite picture of the members of
the Supreme Court. Justices are generally (1) native; (2) male; (3) cauca-
sian; (4) Protestant; (5) 50 to 55 years old at the time of appointment; (6)
Anglo-Saxon ethnic stock; (7) upper-middle to high social status; (8)
reared in an urban environment; (9) a member of a politically active, eco-
nomically comfortable family; (10) experienced in public office and (11)
generally well educated. 40
In effect, then, there seem to be certain unwritten requirements for
serving on the Supreme Court. For example, given that justices are first
attorneys, a threshold barrier exists preventing the disadvantaged from
moving into the ranks of the judiciary. Because a judge must first be a
lawyer, noted James Eisenstein, "all of the social, economic, and cultural
J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1960).
37 Id.
3 S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 67 (2d ed. 1976).
J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 36, at 55.
4 H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 62-63 (4th ed. 1980).
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factors that limit the opportunities of the poor and minority group mem-
bers in our society to obtain a college education operate to restrict access
to the legal profession."'" A study of federal appeals and district court
judges by Goldman indicated that they too come from upper middle class
backgrounds.4 2 Most appointees by both Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon attended prestigious universities. At the same time, the Johnson
appointees, however, were more likely to come from smaller firms, were
often of a Catholic or Jewish religious affiliation and included more
women and blacks than the Nixon appointees. Nevertheless, it seems un-
questionable that many barriers still prevent a disadvantaged person
from serving as a judge.
The crucial aspect of this discussion is that we can expect that the
social backgrounds of judges will have at least some impact on the
kinds of decisions they make. Richard J. Richardson and Kenneth Vines
have concluded that the nature of recruitment is especially important for
the judiciary "because of the quasi-insulated character of courts. Once
judges are selected they tend to be shielded from political pressures, ex-
cept for those pressures that are admissible under the severely controlled
channels of the legal process."43Analyzing the Supreme Court, John R.
Schmidhauser has determined:
If... the Supreme Court is the keeper of the American conscience, it is
essentially the conscience of the American upper-middle class sharpened by
the imperative of individual social responsibility and political activism, and
conditioned by the conservative impact of legal training and professional
legal attitudes and associations."
Hence, it would seem that excluding economically disadvantaged individ-
uals from the judiciary affects the nature of our legal system. For exam-
ple, Schmidhauser has found that justices from humble origins were more
likely to abandon precedents than justices who came from upper-status
families.45 Moreover, Stuart Nagel has concluded that Democratic judges
were more likely to vote for the "underdog" in cases before them.46
Given the nature of judicial personnel, the quality of justice received
by a defendant may sometimes depend upon such extra-legal factors as
race, sex and socioeconomic status. Notably, Richard Quinney has con-
41 J. EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 56 (1973).
' Goldman, Judicial Backgrounds, Recruitment and the Party Variable: The Case of the
Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the United States District and Appeals Courts, 1974
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 211, 221.
" R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS 56 (1970).
J . SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 36, at 59.
48 J. SCHMIDHAUSER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 513 (1963).
See Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 843,
845 (1961).
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cluded: "Obviously judicial decisions are not made uniformly. Decisions
are made according to a host of extra-legal factors, including the age of
the offender, his race, and social class."'" A recent analysis by John Ha-
gan, however, suggested that extra-legal attributes may not play as strong
a role in determining sentences as is commonly believed.48 Studies have
been unable to explain a very large portion of the variance in sentencing
decisions by looking at extra-legal factors alone. Yet, it may be that some
judges are relatively harsh with the disadvantaged, while others are leni-
ent. Indeed, Hagan conceded that "it is certainly plausible to expect vari-
ation in the attitudes of judges toward different groups of offenders.'"'
Moreover, it is important to note that the same judge will often treat
white collar crimes far more leniently than street crimes of a similar na-
ture.8 0 Harsher penalties for certain types of crimes almost invariably
work to the detriment of the disadvantaged.
Police
The most immediate instrumentality of society to prevent crime and
apprehend criminals is the police force. It often has been asserted that
police provide inferior services in low income neighborhoods. It may well
be that the "thin blue line" is "thinner" in poor areas than in the affluent
areas of a community. The evidence suggests, however, that police re-
sponse time to calls from poor city neighborhoods is no less rapid than
responses to calls from the affluent. In their study, Miadenka and Hill
concluded: "The police do not respond less quickly to calls for assistance
from black and other low income neighborhoods nor do they favor
wealthy areas of the city in terms of manpower allocation.""1
.Obviously, this does not mean that the police are free from discrimi-
nation in all their dealings with the poor. In other aspects, however, low
income people are more likely to be victims of police discretion and
abuse. James Eisenstein has noted that "[p]olice seem to show less re-
spect for the disadvantaged. . . .They are more likely to believe middle-
class victims and treat them politely than they do lower-class victims."''s
Additionally, an individual is more likely to be stopped as a suspect for a
crime if he is poor. As James Q. Wilson has pointed out, "Patrolmen be-
lieve they would be derelict in their duty if they did not treat such per-
,7 R. QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF CRIME 142 (1970).
" See Hagan, supra note 9, at 375.
" Id. at 380.
50 See THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, REPORT ON SENTENCING
PRACTICES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS IN NEW YORK CITY in JUSTICE IN SENTENCING 177, 181 (L.
Orland & H. Tyler eds. 1974).
8, Mladenka & Hill, supra note 8, at 24.
2 J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 41, at 324.
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sons [teenagers, blacks, and the poor] with suspicion, routinely question
them on the street, and detain them for longer questioning if a crime has
occurred in the area."" As police "handle situations" they may well speak
harshly and discourteously or illegally search the citizen who has been
stopped-particularly if he is poor or black. Nearly all police-citizen con-
tacts involving excessive police force involved a poor or young person."
Since the police apparently preceive the middle class individual as non-
threatening, such a person can be approached in a more relaxed man-
ner-if indeed he need be approached at all.5
Juries
Another important participant in the legal process is the jury. Juries
make important decisions of guilt and innocence. Given their critical role
in dispensing justice, it is disturbing to learn that often juries do not rep-
resent a true cross-section of the population. The vision of the jury as "a
certain number of citizens chosen indiscriminantly" 6 becomes blurred by
the fact that many people are systematically excluded from serving. For
example, teachers, doctors, firemen and policemen are among those typi-
cally excused from jury duty because of their value to the community."
These exemptions are often seen as unfortunate because of the supposed
"superior ability" of these groups for jury duty. Far more important, how-
ever, is the fact that working class people and blacks are under-
represented on juries in favor of professionals, managers and proprie-
tors.58 Despite the fact most criminal defendants come from the
disadvantaged, there are few lower-economic-status jurors. Thus, in the
contemporary criminal justice system, the fate of the defendant rarely
rests with his peers. This may account for the fact that "juries are notori-
ously prone to convict." 9 At the same time, it should be noted that the
underrepresentation of the working class on juries rarely results from
conscious efforts to exclude them. Rather, exemptions are granted to cer-
tain classes of people who cannot afford to serve on a jury. Then too,
many disadvantaged people may be excluded from the original listing
from which jurors are called because they are not registered voters.60 Con-
tinued exclusion of the disadvantaged from juries seems more an over-
53 J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 40-41 (1968).
51 See id. at 45 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 1, 146-49, 180-83 (1967))
See H. JACOB, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA 54 (1980).
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 287.
6 H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 127.
5 Id. at 128.
A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES & IRONICS 191 (2d ed. 1979).
60 H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 127.
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sight then a malicious or deliberate effort.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The criminal courtroom is a veritable ghetto of the poor. Any effort,
therefore, to increase the rights of those accused of a crime presumably
will be of some benefit to the poor. 1 In this light, the effect of the Warren
Court in the criminal justice realm must be considered. As Jonathan D.
Casper has recognized: "[riecent developments have attempted to remove
some of the infirmities attached to being poor, though they have not yet
resulted in removing them completely." 2 One of the most far-reaching
cases in this area is Gideon v. Wainwright,63 wherein the Supreme Court
adopted a broad rule requiring that indigents receive counsel in state
courts in all cases involving possible imprisonment." The Warren Court
also has ruled that, under certain circumstances, the state must provide
counsel to indigents before interrogation by police,"5 at the preliminary
hearing, 6 at the first appeal from a criminal conviction 67 and at a line-
up.' 8 During the Warren years, the "rules of the game" in criminal courts,
as articulated by Supreme Court doctrine, were altered substantially. One
might naturally expect, therefore, that a poor person accused of a crime
will receive far better treatment than would a person in similar circum-
stances prior to the Warren era. Nevertheless, these decisions cannot be
interpreted to mean that there is an absence of discrimination against the
poor in contemporary criminal law and its administration." Indeed, the
effects of the decisions are still unclear. For example, despite gloomy pre-
dictions, the Miranda7 0 decision apparently has not reduced the convic-
tion rates of the criminal justice system.71 The reason, it is suggested, is
that lawyers appointed to assist the accused actually serve a quasi-bu-
' Professor Jacob has summarized the situation as follows: "All the evidence available indi-
cates that the criminal courts are fundamentally courts against the poor." H. JACOB, supra
note 7, at 185.
" J. CASPER, THE POLrrIcs OF CiviL LmERTmS 196 (1972).
63 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" Id. at 344.
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam).
" Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
" United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
" See, e.g., Reid, Optimism Is Not Warranted: The Fate of Minorities and the Economi-
cally Poor Before the Burger Court, 20 How. L.J. 346, 347 (1977). Ms. Reid, who was Gen-
eral Counsel of the New York State Division for Youth at the time, charged that "[t~he
Burger Court has brandished the conservative tool of law as a rich instrument not only of a
changeless society but also of a regressive society." Id.
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 189.
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reaucratic system, the aim of which is to obtain convictions as efficiently
as possible. It appears that many of those who plead guilty to a crime do
so under the advice of their own counsel. Public defenders and, especially,
assigned counsel are often less effective than criminal lawyers privately
hired. As James Eisenstein has suggested: "[t]he adversarial ideal is noth-
ing like what happens to the overwhelming majority of people (on the
order of 90 percent) who find themselves in a state felony court. Rather,
they encounter . . . the bureaucratic reality of state felony courts. '"7
As Professor Jacobs has pointed out, affluent people who are accused
of a property crime enjoy certain advantages over their less affluent coun-
terparts.7 3 They can avoid pretrial detention by paying bail. The affluent
can hire a renowned criminal specialist as an attorney. Furthermore, psy-
chiatrists and medical doctors may provide qualified assistance and valu-
able testimony. A wealthy individual qualifies as a good probation risk
because he maintains a job and strong family ties. Finally, he can delay or
avoid serving his sentence, if convicted, through appeals. These strategies
often are unavailable to the disadvantaged defendant. The economically
disadvantaged therefore are far more at the mercy of the bureaucratic
processes of our criminal justice system.
A stunning example of economic discrimination in the criminal jus-
tice system is found in bail practices. Indigent defendants are often re-
quired to submit to pretrial imprisonment merely to obtain legal assis-
tance. In many communities, existing practices presume that if a
defendant can afford bail he can also provide himself with an attorney.
7 4
The equity of these bail practices is questionable. Indeed, Jonathan D.
Casper has concluded that "[tihe very concept of money bail means that
the rich will be more likely to be free during the period between arraign-
ment -and trial than the poor. '7 5 Similarly, Daniel Fried and Patricia
Wald have noted, "[t]hose who go free on bail are released not because
they are innocent but because they can buy their liberty. The balance are
detained not because they are guilty, but because they are poor."* In his
study of criminal justice in New York City, Abraham S. Blumberg found
that bail was "the greatest disparity between those who have money and
those who do not."'7 Notably, nearly three-quarters of the indigents he
examined were unable to raise bail.
72 J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 41.
73 See H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 185-86.
7 Id. at 68.
75 J. CASPER, supra note 62, at 200.
76 D. FRIED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE vii (1964).
77 A. BLUMBERG, supra note 59, at 175.
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In Stack v. Boyles7 8 the Supreme Court stated that bail was constitu-
tionally permissible only as a means to ensure that the defendant would
appear at his trial.79 The Court ruled that a "figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under
the Eighth Amendment."80 Unfortunately, however, the Court suggested
no specific standards. As a result, it is common practice for judges to take
varying factors into account when setting bail. Failing to meet bail not
only means that a defendant is unable to assist in preparing for his de-
fense, but also that he is unable to be with his family. Recently, attempts
have been made to lessen the harmful effects of bail requirements on the
poor. s ' A prime advocate of bail reform has been the Vera Institute of
Justice."2 Under the Vera system, an effort is made to gather data to de-
termine the probability of a defendant's appearing at trial. Among the
facts gathered are employment history, stability of family ties, nearby rel-
atives and community roots.8 The aim of the Vera system is to ensure
that the accused will be released on his own recognizance if it appears he
is a good risk. Of course, many of the poor still cannot meet these stan-
dards and cannot afford the bail which is set. Additionally, despite the
reform efforts of the last decade, the evidence suggests that bail reform
has not changed the plight of the economically disadvantaged.8
Beyond the issue of pretrial detention, we must look to the very
78 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
Id. at 5.
8I Id. The Stack holding was limited to application in the federal courts, but it is considered
to be the origin of the "key concepts" which played a large role in the subsequent bail
reform movement. J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 19 (1979).
" J. CASPER, supra note 62, at 200-01.
" See Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use
of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671 (1963). The Vera Institute work began in 1961
and continued into the early 1970's. It was the impetus for many of the early "release on
recognizance" reform projects which were undertaken in the United States in the 1960's. J.
GOLDKAMP, supra note 80, at 5.
", See W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 11-12 (1976). Much of the legislation, case law
and sociological studies of the last decade regarding bail have involved the search for work-
able criteria to be considered in the pretrial release decision. See, e.g., United States v.
Wright, 483 F.2d 1068, 1069 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Honeyman, 470 F.2d 473, 474
(9th Cir. 1972); Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1976).
", Professor Goldkamp, in his recent analysis and reexamination of bail and detention issues
after 15 years of reform, concluded: "[t]he most striking consequence of this investigation
... is the realization that, in spite of the herculean efforts of reformers during the last
decade, there has been little impact on a number of what by now are certainly very old
issues." J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 80, at 231. His study of characteristics of defendants de-
tained in United States jails suggested that "the persons originally seen as most disadvan-
taged by the American system of bail and detention-minorities and low-income defen-
dants-may still be the principal 'clients' of pretrial detention." Id. at 88.
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structure of criminal penalties. It is here that the sharpest inequalities in
criminal justice can be found.8 ' Generally, street crimes are committed by
poor people. This does not mean, of course, that affluent people never
violate the law. Often, however, white collar crime goes undetected or un-
punished. The more liberal attitude toward white collar criminals repre-
sents a serious inequity in our society. James Eisenstein has noted that
"there is probably some truth to the assertion that the content of crimi-
nal law tends to fall more heavily on the poor. The activities the least
well-off engage in are far more likely to be formally labeled as criminal.""
There is no inherent reason, it is submitted, why white collar crimes
of the affluent should be dealt with less severely than the street crimes of
the poor. Indeed, the economic loss to the nation from white collar crimes
is far greater than the loss due to street crimes. It has been estimated
that the cost of white collar crime exceeds the cost of burglary and rob-
bery by several billions of dollars.' 7 In 1977, the United States General
Accounting Office reported that white collar crime within government
agencies cost over $25 billion yearly, while the Uniform Crime Reports for
that year estimated loss of the value of stolen property to be $4 billion."
Nonetheless, prisons are disproportionately filled with the poor. While
41% of the general labor force is white collar, only 14% of the prison
population comes from those ranks. Meanwhile, 43% of prisoners are
manual laborers or service workers, compared to only 17% of the labor
force.' 9 Then too, the living conditions at prisons populated by the afflu-
ent often are far superior to the conditions at prisons inhabited by the
poor.
It also should be noted that a disproportionate number of the victims
of crime are low in status. Paradoxically, street crimes are for the most
part committed by the poor against the poor. As Eric Wright has noted:
This is one of the great ironies of crime: the poor are more likely to steal
from the poor than from the rich because it is easier and safer. It is also
easier and safer for the rich and powerful to steal from the poor and power-
less-through consumer fraud, price fixing, loan sharking, and indirectly,
even through tax evasion.90
It is small wonder that our country traditionally has done so little to as-
sist the victims of crime; victims tend to be the powerless poor. Moreover,
the disadvantaged suffer not only material losses as a result of crime, but
" See generally W. SEYMOUR, WHY JUSTICE FAILS 45-48 (1973).
" J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 41, at 328.
" C. MCCAGHY, CRIME IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 245 (1980) (citing CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 4-6, 39 (1974)).
" C. MCCAGHY, supra note 87, at 246.
E. WRIGHT, THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT 25 (1973).
go Id. at 38.
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also experience a general state of anxiety. The segregation of poor people
in a substandard environment means that the poor live in fear of being
victims of crime."' In one study, a 1974 sample was asked: "Is there any
area right around here-that is, within a mile-where you would be
afraid to walk alone at night?" Only 28% of those with incomes of
$15,000 and over were fearful. Meanwhile, 58% of those with incomes
under $3,000 said they were afraid to walk alone at night. This fear of
crime further impoverishes the lives of poor people.9 2
CIVIL JUSTICE
It is submitted that a substantial amount of discrimination can also
be found in the civil courts. Despite increased legal aid to the poor, many
poor people apparently fail to receive adequate legal assistance. Legal aid
programs remain underfinanced, seriously limiting the kinds of cases that
can be taken and the amount of effort invested in a given case. Herbert
Jacob has noted that "[liegal aid has not thus far made the courts a re-
source of the poor to a significant degree." 9 Notwithstanding legal aid,
the poor person rarely uses the courts aggressively to assert his rights.
Most legal aid cases deal with family matters or defenses against land-
lords, merchants or governmental agencies. In part, changes are needed in
the legal attitudes of the poor. Disadvantaged people have little knowl-
edge of the law, few friends with such knowledge and a skepticism about
their chances of success in the courtroom. At the same time, serious
problems still arise in the administration of legal aid. One legal aid
worker has recently commented:
We have inadequate resources, a lack of advertisement funds, low-salaried
and non-dedicated personnel, pressure from the bar and business organiza-
tions that finance us, and attorneys who are often not responsive to clients
because they feel their services to the poor are a privilege and not a consti-
tutional right of the poor. How can the public wonder why we have not
provided adequate legal representation for the poor?"
It is important to note that legal aid organizations are faced with external
obstacles as well in the content and administration of the civil law. s5
" Hindelang, Public Opinion Regarding Crime, Criminal Justice, and Related Topics, in
THE ALDINE CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL 1974, 56 (1975).
Id. at 55.
* H. JACOS, supra note 7, at 206.
" This is taken from an interview conducted by the authors with a legal aid worker.
Indeed, a recent study suggested that the early concern of many commentators with re-
spect to the competence of attorneys has now turned to focus on a number of system-related
problems in determining the causes of inadequate representation for the poor. J. Gilboy,
The Social Organization of Legal Services to Indigent Defendants, 1981 AM. B. FOUNDA-
TION Research J. 1023, 1024.
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Civil courts, it is suggested, "are the courtrooms of the 'haves' rather
than the 'have nots.' "96 Discrimination against the poor is greatest in
debt collection and housing cases. Here, the poor are nearly always defen-
dants, but plaintiffs almost invariably win. Notably, James Eisenstein has
concluded:
At the lower levels, then, the civil process actually operates as an instru-
ment for the commercial and the propertied interests to use in dealing with
the poor. Landlords and creditors utilize the formal coercive power of the
state to evict tenants, repossess merchandise, seize money (garnishments)
and conduct forced sales of goods."
Moreover, it has been noted that civil actions generally are initiated by
strong interests such as banks, department stores, hospitals, doctors and
lawyers. 9s Organizations nearly always win in head-to-head combat
against individuals. Thus, civil courts may often appear to be mere vehi-
cles by which organizational plaintiffs gain goods and opportunities at the
expense of individual clients, who often are poor.
Perhaps, it is no accident that the civil court process is complicated.
Historically, law in Western society was meant to uphold property rights
and protect the interests of those who hold property.' 9 Commentators
have pointed out that "the powerful spend large sums of money and
devote substantial energy to keep the law in a favorable configura-
tion. . . . [Fline print which is always inimical to the interests of the
poor and low-income wage earners. . . becomes the legal currency of the
rich and powerful."100 While high-status members of society often are
able to parlay their wealth into success on the legal front, large organiza-
tions likewise use their great resources to win favorable results in civil
courts. Big business and government organizations are always well repre-
sented. The legal profession is organized around property-related
problems to the virtual exclusion of those problems most frequently en-
countered by poor people. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he best
legal talent is found in law firms located in downtown areas and specializ-
ing in corporation law, estates, tax matters, and the like. Few private at-
torneys specialize in problems of the poor or locate offices in their neigh-
borhoods." 101 Large organizations are "repeat players"10 in the civil
H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 194.
97 J. EiSENSTEIN, supra note 41, at 330.
" Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations, 8 LAW & Soc'Y Rzv. 421, 423-25
(1974).
Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAW & Soc'v
REV. 401, 401 (1975).
100 LADINSKY, supra note 24, at 53.
i01 J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 41, at 332.
102 Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
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courts, and can win favorable decisions on the rules of the game as well as
the outcome of cases. Meanwhile, agencies for the poor often serve con-
trary interests. The Small Claims Court was created as a forum in which
a poor plaintiff could pursue his legal rights without being hindered by
legal technicalities and high costs. Nonetheless, it has been used by busi-
ness to collect debts against the poor.
Because due process norms are commonly violated in the civil courts,
it is not surprising to learn that the poor often perceive the legal system
as inequitable based on their personal experiences. 101 The system aims at
processing cases efficiently, much as goods are processed on an assembly
line. For example, civil commitment cases-though they involve the loss
of liberty-receive only a few minutes of court time. On that score, evi-
dence indicates that most of those in involuntary civil commitment pro-
ceedings are poor people.1 04 In addition, mentally ill indigents frequently
are inadequately represented.10 5 As a result, civil commitment proceed-
ings almost invariably lead to a commitment. Moreover, in the area of
indebtedness, many debtors never receive notice that there is an action
pending against them. For the poor, this "sewer service" results in the
loss of countless cases each year through default. As Jacob has concluded:
"Although the due process rituals of the adversarial process should pro-
tect them against unscrupulous complaints, they rarely do so."'"6
Of late, there have been some beneficial changes in civil court rules,
procedures, and policies. One commentator has concluded that "[p]ast in-
equalities in civil proceedings are . . . receding."10 7 An important exam-
ple is in the area of bankruptcy. The Edwards Act of 197808 makes it
relatively easy-some say too easy-for a debtor to get a fresh start.'0" At
the same time, it is important for our purposes to note that most bank-
rupts are blue-collar workers rather than the poor.110 Many of the poor
cannot possibly benefit from bankruptcy laws since they are denied credit
to begin with. Where gains have been made by the poor in civil courts,
two factors seem to be involved." 1 First, governmental sponsorship of le-
gal services to the poor has continued. Second, there have been changes
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 98-104 (1974).
103 See J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD, & S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR 4-9 (1966).
104 Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the Courtroom, 11
LAW AND Soc'y REV. 651, 657 (1977).
,05 Houseman, Equal Protection and the Poor, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 892 (1977).
100 H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 207.
107 Id. at 238.
I0" Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
151326 (Supp. IV 1980)).
'0 Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 64 A.B.A. J. 1865, 1866 (1978).
110 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 2 (1971).
"' See H. JACOB, supra note 7, at 138-39.
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in substantive civil law. This partly. reflects the fact that in 1970 the rules
permitting groups to litigate issues affecting their interests were liberal-
ized by the Supreme Court. 1 ' The civil courts may be more accessible
than other governmental institutions. As Jacob has noted, "[t]o be influ-
ential in legislatures, a group needs to occupy a strategic position in the
economy or to claim the allegiance of a significant number of voters. No
such prerequisites are required in the courts." '
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Inequalities in the legal system can be rectified in part by judicial
activism. Contemporary judicial activism consists, however, of a confused
bundle of decisions-some actively pro-poor, others directly or indirectly
contrary to the interests of poor people. A few cases will be illustrative. In
Brown v. Board of Education,"" the Supreme Court began the process of
desegregation of the school systems." Yet, since that landmark decision,
several setbacks have occurred." 6 Many affluent people have been able to
escape desegregation efforts by sending their children to private schools
or by making their home in the suburbs. The result has been less eco-
nomic integration than racial integration of the poor and those of moder-
ate income. Additionally, in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,"' the Court failed to take action against school finance dis-
parities from one school district to another. The result is that wealthy
districts, often populated by affluent people, can more easily provide high
quality education. 18 Justice Thurgood Marshall described the majority's
decision in Rodriquez as "an emasculation of the Equal Protection
Clause."" Similarly, by failing to take large-scale action against exclu-
sionary zoning, the Supreme Court has permitted certain suburbs to be-
come an exclusive haven for the affluent. Affluent people in affluent sub-
. Id. at 138 (citing Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts,
Am. POL. Smi. REv. 723, 723-41 (1976)).
H' -. JACOB, supra note 7, at 138.
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
I See id. For a chronology and discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions on school de-
segregation, see H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 310-21 (1972).
11 See generally Bolner & Eubanks, The Poverty of Justice: The Burger Court and the
Poor, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 351 (1978); Kleven, The Supreme Court, Race, and the Class Strug-
gle, 9 HOPSTRA L. REV. 795 (1981).
317 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
"' See id. at 36. Professors Bolner and Eubanks have labeled the Rodriguez decision as
"It]he nadir of the constitutional progress of the poor." Bolner & Eubanks, supra note 116,
at 377. In Rodriguez, "the issue of the social consequences of wealth was lucidly posed-and
the Court responded by siding with the forces of wealth." Id.
"' 411 U.S. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Levy, The Supreme Court in Retreat:
Wealth Discrimination and Mr. Justice Marshall, 4 TEx. S.U.L. REV. 209, 211 (1976-1977).
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urbs can enjoy municipal services and residential environments., In
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,120 the Supreme Court upheld the au-
thority of towns and villages to restrict land use to one-family dwellings.
Two years later, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.,"'1 the Court upheld exclusionary zoning restrictions of a Chi-
cago suburb. In short, the Court has refused to use the tool of judicial
activism to alleviate discrimination based upon economic disparities."2
Many commentators have suggested, however, that the judiciary may
be the prime source for the equalization process. For example, Donald L.
Horowitz has argued that "the judiciary tends to be far more sensitive to
claims grounded in equal protection [than the legislative branch] and
therefore more willing to order leveling of any kind.""2 3 Yet, from a his-
torical standpoint, the Supreme Court has almost always employed judi-
cial activism to preserve conservative values rather than to achieve liberal
goals. The Horowitz hypothesis would be applicable to only a limited
number of years in Supreme Court history-from 1937 to 1969. In his
study of the Supreme Court, Glendon Schubert has divided Court deci-
sionmaking into five major eras."1' The first three-covering nearly 150
years of American history-include the Federalist/Marshall period (1790-
1835), the Taney/Miller period (1836-1890), and the period of Modern
Conservatism (1890-1937). In each of these periods, the Court's decisions
were conservative and highly protective of property rights. The commerce
clause was used to deny state authority to regulate business during the
first period. In the second period,"' state authority to encourage eco-
"' 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974).
... 429 U.S. 252, 268-71 (1976).
"'2 One commentator has criticized the reluctance of the current Supreme Court to interfere
in social issues:
I can think of no theory of justice, consistent with democratic principles, which would
condone a caste system. When the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of
governmental action (or inaction), it is in effect saying such action is not inconsistent
with our fundamental democratic ideals. Thus in Rodriguez, the Court has put its
stamp of approval on a system of financing public education which makes it impossi-
ble for the children of the very poor to get an education comparable to what more
affluent children have access to. In declining to tackle the exclusionary-zoning issue,
it has put its stamp of approval on a system of land-use planning which ensures that
the poor will remain segregated in lower-class ghettos. And, in giving total deference
to governmental welfare determination, the Court has opened the door to imposing
on the poor a disproportionate share of the costs of the inflationary-recessionary era
we now face. We should expect more from the Court. We should expect a statement
of its willingness to intervene in an appropriate case and of its moral disapproval
when such a case is at hand.
Kleven, supra note 116, at 857.
"I D. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 258 (1977).
G. SCHUBERT, supra note 11, at 191.
Id. at 192.
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nomic growth was promoted.""8 Laissez faire was in its heyday during the
third period. During that time, the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment were used primarily to protect pri-
vate property from public interference.1 2 7
The Supreme Court altered its philosophy from conservative to lib-
eral during the depths of the depression. At the same time, the Supreme
Court also shifted its basic focus from the issue of property rights to ac-
tivism in behalf of civil rights and liberties. The most liberal of the Su-
preme Court eras, however, was under Chief Justice Earl Warren. During
the Warren years, the Supreme Court focused on political equality, rights
of the accused and racial equality. Additionally, in a series of key cases,
the legal rights of indigents were extended. 28
With the appointment of more conservative justices, however, the
Supreme Court has now entered an era of retreat in the pursuit of equal-
ity."2" Certainly, judicial attitudes have played a critical role in the
decisions which courts make.130 Schubert has suggested that the era of
Modern Liberalism has come to a close with Nixon's conservative ap-
pointments of Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Powell."' An equally
important, and related, factor in the retreat of the Supreme Court has
been its reluctance to regard economic deprivation as a fundamental con-
stitutional concern.1 2 There has been no broad legal movement to assist
poor people similar to the civil rights movement of blacks. To date, the
Court has not chosen to employ the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause to grant substantial, broadly-based economic rights to poor
Americans. Given this failure, it is not surprising that the position of the
poor relative to the affluent has changed little since the end of World War
11.133
126 Id.
121 Id. at 194-95.
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'1' Levy, supra note 119, at 209.
0SO Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 491, 504-05 (1975).
131 See G. SCHUBERT, supra note 11, at 198.
132 E. GREENBERG, SERVING THE FEW (1974).
13 Another significant aspect of the Rodriguez decision was its rejection of the "suspect"
classification for the indigent. 411 U.S. at 40. If the Court holds that a certain group is a
suspect class, it will apply a higher level of scrutiny-a "strict scrutiny"-to governmental
action impacting on that class. Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (Court
applies rigid scrutiny to suspect classification of race). During the Warren Court era, deci-
sions had indicated, in dicta, a willingness by the Court to find poverty status a suspect
classification. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The Rodriguez decision re-
jected the suspect status for the poor, thereby precluding the opportunity for greater protec-
tion and activism by the Court.
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CONCLUSION
This discussion has identified a series of inequalities in our legal sys-
tem. In A Theory of Justice,"4 John Rawls contends that socially just
institutions are those which people would agree to if ignorant of their
social status."5 Rawls argues that, in a state of ignorance, people would
agree to institutions that maximize the well-being of the least ad-
vantaged. People would favor such institutions, explains Rawls, in order
to minimize their own risks in life. Thus, only those inequalities which
redound to the benefit of all, including the disadvantaged, would be re-
tained." ' It has been shown above that our legal system contains count-
less inequalities. According to Rawls, however, inequalities should be re-
tained in society only if, all things considered, the inequality in question
somehow benefits the least advantaged.137 A suitable task for the policy
analyst, then, is to identify the inequalities that are detrimental to the
poor and those which, in some respects, may be beneficial.'"
Since a number of inequalities detrimental to the poor can exist in
our legal system, according to Rawls, it is the responsibility of govern-
ment to secure the equal distribution of rights."s" For example, poor peo-
ple are negatively affected by the demographic unrepresentativeness of
legal participants. Poor people would be better off in many respects if
they were found in greater numbers as lawyers, judges, police and jurors.
Greater representation in the bar, for example, would reflect increased
social mobility for the poor to high-status positions in our society. Reduc-
ing the stratification within the bar would also benefit the poor since dis-
advantaged people are often served by the least effective lawyers. Because
a judge's background affects his decisions, increased representation of
those with poverty backgrounds on the bench would likely advance the
interests of the poor. A greater presence of the poor on the police force
might reduce instances of police brutality and permit the poor to be less
fearful of both crime and the police. Finally, more representative juries
J j. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
' See id. at 15.
I Id. at 62.
' See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 92 (1975); J. RAWLS, supra
note 134, at 62.
"' See also Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). Michelman proposed a
"minimum protection" standard. See id. at 33. The approach would require identifying dep-
rivations which would be intolerable to all in a just society. Id. at 35. Michelman suggested
that his approach was more closely related to a due process inquiry than an equal protection
analysis. For a recent provocative discussion which suggests that the issues being raised here
would be better approached in terms of "rights" rather than "equality," see Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
. J. RAWLS, supra note 134, at 274-76.
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which include a greater number of disadvantaged people might be less
likely to hurriedly convict an indigent defendant where the evidence is in
doubt.
Inequalities inimical to the interests of the poor, as noted earlier, ex-
ist both in criminal and civil justice as well as in the area of judicial activ-
ism. The dependence of the poor on public defenders and assigned coun-
sel appears to render them especially vulnerable to the bureaucratic
processes and injustices of the criminal courts. The pretrial detention
which occurs because of the bail system certainly operates to deny liberty
to countless indigent defendants awaiting disposition of their cases. It is
suggested that more jurisdictions give serious consideration to serious re-
form in bail procedures. Unequal treatment of white-collar crime and
street crime also seems contrary to the interests of the poor. Harsher pen-
alties for white-collar crimes would act as a deterrent and would reduce
the sense of injustice felt by many of the poor. Then too, the fact that
victims of street crimes are disproportionately disadvantaged suggests a
need for more adequately financed victim compensation programs. On the
civil side, the preservation of the Legal Services Corporation seems essen-
tial to providing representation for the poor. It might well lead to reforms
in the substance and procedures of civil justice. Finally, a judicial activ-
ism which more willingly invokes the guarantees of the equal protection
clause to protect the rights of the poor would produce a redistribution of
national resources in the direction of the disadvantaged. A number of
benefits would then be regarded as constitutionally guaranteed to the
poor, including better financed schools and improved living environments.
At the same time, it is not clear that the poor would really benefit
from a more demographically representative bar. To begin with, a more
representative bar would be unlikely to reorient the bar from its preoccu-
pation with the property-related problems of the affluent. As a result,
many of the legal needs of the poor would continue to be ignored. Addi-
tionally, it is possible that increasing the number of lawyers with disad-
vantaged backgrounds might simply create a large class of lower-status
lawyers. Here, two facts are relevant: (1) the existing bar in metropolitan
areas already is highly stratified; and (2) lower-status lawyers tend to
come from working-class or small-merchant backgrounds. A more demo-
graphically representative bar might very well mean less effective legal
services for the disadvantaged. In a highly competitive market, the large
underclass of lawyers servicing the poor would have greater temptations
to be unethical and would have less of an opportunity to engage in spe-
cialized practice.
In view of the complex nature of the issues involved, it is possible
that implementing a wholesale process of equalization may be less benefi-
cial than some commentators have predicted. Therefore, it is imperative
that policy analysts and public officials think carefully about the conse-
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quences of proposed reforms. The purpose of social policy must not be to
satisfy the reformist inclinations of "do-gooders" to "do something." It is
submitted that reformers should advocate effective social policies which
achieve their intended goals without producing serious and unexpected
negative effects. Nevertheless, there is clearly a need for fundamental re-
form throughout the legal system in order to ensure the full participation
of the poor.
